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The Billionaire Space Race: Can Biden Bridle Bezos?
Rachel Jacob*
I.

Introduction
So here . . . is the first generation of the Spaceborn; there would be more of them
in the years to come. Though there was sadness in this thought, there was also a
great hope. When Earth was tamed and tranquil, and perhaps a little tired, there
would still be scope for those who loved freedom, for the tough pioneers, the
restless adventurers. But their tools would not be ax and gun and canoe and
wagon; they would be nuclear power plant and plasma drive and hydroponic
farm. The time was fast approaching when Earth, like all mothers, must say
farewell to her children.1
Outer space is the sort of subject that makes for highly acclaimed science-fiction films

and literature: its breadth is fascinating, yet it feels distant from everyday reality. But what if
human life in space was not just a fictional notion, conceivable only “in a galaxy far, far away”? 2
In 2011, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) and its
international partners completed the construction of the International Space Station (“ISS”).3 The
ISS has made it possible for humans to have an ongoing presence in space; in fact, astronauts
have lived on the ISS since 2000, well before the construction of the station was completed. 4 In
2024, NASA expects to send the first woman and next man to the moon through the agency’s
Artemis lunar exploration.5 By that time, fifty-five years will have passed since the first man on
the moon, Neil Armstrong, planted the American flag on the moon’s lunar highlands. 6 Artemis is
tasked with exploring the entirety of the moon’s surface, with an intention to find water and

*

J.D. Candidate, 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., cum laude, 2019, The George Washington
University.
1 Arthur C. Clarke, 2001: A Space Odyssey, 61 (Ray Lovejoy et al. eds., 1968).
2 STAR WARS EPISODE IV: A NEW H OPE (Twentieth Century Fox 1977).
3 What Is the International Space Station?, NASA (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/58/features/nasa-knows/what-is-the-iss-58.html.
4 Id.
5 What is Artemis, NASA (July 25, 2019), https://www.nasa.gov/what-is-artemis.
6 July 20, 1969: One Giant Leap For Mankind, NASA (July 20, 2019),
https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/apollo/apollo11.html.
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other critical resources needed for long-term exploration.7 As of September 2021, the world has
witnessed two commercial suborbital space flights, and one civilian-only orbital trip around the
Earth.8
This paper argues that the modernization of space-related technology has initiated a host
of uncertain and potentially destabilizing issues surrounding space exploration, space
governance, and international security. As a result, the Biden Administration, with the help of
other influential nations (i.e., superpowers)9 , must update international treaties to better reflect
the modern complexities relating to outer space. Without the adequate development of space law
alongside technology, relations between nations will quickly deteriorate. 10 However, since
multilateral treaties of this sort often take years to come to fruition 11 , the Biden Administration

7

NASA, supra note 5.
Michelle Shen, William Shatner went to space. Here's how much it would cost you., USA TODAY (Sept. 15, 2021),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2021/09/15/how-can-go-space-inspiration-4-and-future-spacetravel/8350606002/.
9 See World Superpowers 2021, WORLD POPULATION R EVIEW, https://worldpopulationreview.com/countryrankings/world-superpowers (last visited Dec. 2, 2021) (“[w]orld superpowers, also called global superpowers, are
the world’s most powerful nations that have the most influence over the world. These countries’ have dominant
positions characterized by their ability to exert influence or project power on a global scale.”); Rolando Y. We e,
What are Global Superpowers?, WORLDATLAS (April 25, 2017), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-areglobal-superpowers.html (“Lyman Miller defined superpower as a country that had advantage in the four axes of
power. These are military, economic, political, and cultural.”); Laura Silver, Kat Devlin & Christine Huang, China’s
Economic Growth Mostly Welcomed in Emerging Markets, but Neighbors Wary of Its Influence , PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/12/05/chinas-economic-growth-mostly-welcomed-inemerging-markets-but-neighbors-wary-of-its-influence/ (“China has emerged as a global economic superpower in
recent decades.”).
10 Cf. Joshua Fiveson, Disruptive Technology and the Future of International Law, C OLUMBIA J. I NT ’L AFF. (Feb.
19, 2020), https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/disruptive-technology-and-future-international-law
(discussing the automation of warfare internationally and arguing that “[t]he pace of technology is often far greater
than our collective ability to contemplate its second and third order effects, and this reality counsels cautious
reflection as we enter a new chapter in the age-old story of war and peace.”).
11 See Kimberly Amadeo, Pros and Cons of Multilateral Trade Agreements, THE B ALANCE (May 28, 2021),
https://www.thebalance.com/multilateral-trade-agreements-pros-cons-and-examples-3305949 (“[t]he biggest
disadvantage of multilateral agreements is that they are complex. That makes them difficult and time consuming to
negotiate. Sometimes the length of negotiation means it won't take place at all.”); Christopher Newman, Artemis
Accords: why many countries are refusing to sign Moon exploration agreement , THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 19,
2020), https://theconversation.com/artemis-accords-why-many-countries-are-refusing-to-sign-moon-explorationagreement-148134 (“[p]revious attempts to govern space have been through painstakingly negotiated international
treaties.”).
8
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should prioritize implementing responsible domestic space laws that complement, rather than
contradict, existing international laws.
In Part II, this paper will trace space law as it stands today, particularly focusing on the
“five United Nations treaties on outer space” and other multilateral agreements. 12 This section
will conclude with an examination of the enforceability of these space laws. Part III will then
transition to 21st century developments in space, as were briefly outlined above. Finally, Part IV
will address the United States’ imperative role in shaping the future of space law. Here, this
paper will make the case for a revamped international treaty, spearheaded by the Biden
Administration, that better reflects modern space exploration, governance, and matters of
security.
II.

Space Law As We Know It
There are two juxtaposing reasons why space law could be described as an enigma. On

the one hand, while many Americans are tuned into major developments in space 13 , the average
citizen is likely blissfully unaware of what constitutes “space law”—the body of law that has
regulated such developments.14 Moreover, “while much attention has been paid to the
geostrategic and economic significance of space, perhaps the most foundational area has been

12

International Space Law: United Nations Instruments, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS (May
2017) [hereinafter UN Instruments],
https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2017/stspace/stspace61rev_2_0_html/V1605998ENGLISH.pdf.
13 Se, e.g., Chris Jackson, Attitudes Toward Space Exploration: New C-SPAN/Ipsos Poll, I PSOS (July 10, 2019),
https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/cspan-space-exploration-2019 (“two-thirds of Americans (65%) say they
have watched a space shuttle launch live either in-person, on TV, or via the internet”).
14 See Clyde Haberman, Space Law: The Next Generation, PBS,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/chasing-moon-space-law-next-generation/ (last visited Nov.
2, 2021) (“[i]t may surprise some people to learn that international compacts governing the exploration and
exploitation of space have long made celestial bodies ready for the mercantile taking . . .”); Dean na Paul, Space: The
final legal frontier, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 31, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/31/space-final-legal-frontier/ (“[y]es, space law is a thing.
(And it doesn’t involve real estate or aliens.)”).
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largely left on the backburner: space governance.”15 Yet, space law has in fact existed for over
half a century, and it has only been tested a handful of times.16 This leads to the second reason
why space law is so perplexing: it has stood as a silent protector of humanity for years despite
the fact that it is largely unenforceable.17 This section begins by outlining the various legal
instruments that make up space law, and concludes by examining various arguments on whether
or not space law is enforceable.
A. What is “Space Law”?
Since the first human-made satellite orbited the Earth in 1957, the United Nations has
played an integral role in maintaining the peaceful exploration of space. The UN’s significant
interest in the peaceful exploration of outer space’s unchartered territory was fueled not only by
the obvious historical backdrop of nations battling to expand their jurisdiction, but more
specifically, by the U.S.-Russian rivalry during the Cold War.18 In 1959, the UN established the

15

Sophie Goguichvili et al., The Global Legal Landscape of Space: Who Writes the Rules on the Final Frontier? ,
WILSON CENTER (Oct. 1, 2021), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/global-legal-landscape-space-who-writesrules-final-frontier. See also Jackson, supra note 13 (“[a]bout one in five Americans classify themselves as "very
interested" in space exploration, and only about a third believe the benefits are greater than the costs.”).
16 For example,
[i]n 2006, China targeted a U.S. satellite with a laser, which was interpreted as an anti-satellite
experiment. In 2007, China destroyed one of its own satellites in an ASAT weapon test, creating
an international enormous amount of dangerous space debris. Although China’s actions drew
international condemnation, the conduct was found not to violate the [Outer Space Treaty], and no
country took legal action.
James Fukazawa, Does the U.S. Space Force Violate the Outer Space Treaty?, DENV. J. I NT’L L. & POL’Y, (2020)
(citing Becky Ferreira, The new Space Race, and the desperately outdated laws that govern i t, DOCUMENT JOURNAL
(May 28, 2019), https://www.documentjournal.com/2019/05/the-new-space-race-and-the-desperately-outdated-lawsthat-govern-it/), http://djilp.org/does-the-u-s-space-force-violate-the-outer-space-treaty/#post-9754-footnote-ref-30;
Jason Krause, The Outer Space Treaty turns 50. Can it survive a new space race? , ABA JOURNAL (April 1, 2017,
5:00 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/outer_space_treaty .). See also Henry Hertzfeld, Current
and Future Issues in International Space Law, 15 ISLA J. I NT’L COMPAR. L. 325, 331 (2009) (“[t]here are few
actual cases that have been adjudicated concerning activities actually occurring in space. Most space law today
focuses on more mundane problems such as negotiating government contracts, applying for domestic licenses for
launch and operation of satellites, allocating spectrum rights, or complying with export control issues.”).
17 See discussion infra Section II.B; Haberman, supra note 14 (“‘[w]hat a lot of folks don’t know is that the treaty
was actually a disarmament treaty.’”).
18 See COPOUS History, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/history.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2021); Joanne Irene
Gabrynowicz, Space Law: Its Cold War Origins and Challenges in the Era

- 5-

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) “to govern the exploration and use
of space for the benefit of all humanity: for peace, security and development.” 19 Importantly,
COPUOS was instrumental in developing the five treaties and five principles governing space
law today.20
1. Treaties
There are five commonly referred to UN treaties on outer space: (1) the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies’ (“The Outer Space Treaty”)21 ; (2) the
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space (“The Rescue Agreement”)22 ; (3) the Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (“The Liability Convention”)23 ; (4) the
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (“The Registration
Convention”)24 ; and, (5) the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and

of Globalization, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1041 (2004) (“[b]orn of Cold War forces, the COPUOS space treaties
contain both the aspirations and fears of the times.”); Michael Beaver, Current Space Law Limitations and Its
Implications on Outer Space Conflicts, E-I NTERNATIONAL REL. (June 16, 2015) (citing P. J. Blount, Renovating
Space: The Future of International Space Law, 40 DENV. J. I NT'L L. & POL'Y 515, 16 (2011)), https://www.eir.info/pdf/56755 (since “all five of the major international space treaties were crafted and signed durin g the ‘Cold
War’, the United States and the Soviet Union played a major role as the architects of these cornerstones of space law
and shaped them in accordance with the geopolitical climate between the superpowers at the time.”).
19 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2021).
20 Id.
21 Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
22 Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement]; International Space Law,
SPACE FOUNDATION, https://www.spacefoundation.org/space_brief/international-space-law/ (last visited De. 2,
2021) (“[t]hrough this Agreement, signatories agree to take all possible actions to help or rescue astronauts in need,
and if applicable, return them to the nation from which they launched. Additionally, signatories agree to help return
to the sponsoring nation any space objects that land on Earth outside of the country from which they were
launched.”) [hereinafter SPACE FOUNDATION].
23 Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention]; SPACE FOUNDATION , supra
note 22 (“[t]hrough this Convention, Signatories take full liability for any damage caused by their space objects and
agree to standa rd procedures for adjudicating damage claims.”).
24 Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter, Registration Convention]; SPACE FOUNDATION,
supra note 22 (“[e]xpanding a space object register, the Convention empowers the UN Secretary -General to
maintain a register of all space objects.”).
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Other Celestial Bodies (“The Moon Agreement”)25 . Collectively, these five treaties address
issues ranging from “the non-appropriation of outer space by any one country, arms control,
[and] the freedom of exploration[,]” to “liability for damage caused by space objects, [and] the
safety and rescue of spacecraft and astronauts.” 26 Additionally, these treaties speak to “the
prevention of harmful interference with space activities and the environment, the notification and
registration of space activities, scientific investigation, the exploitation of natural resources in
outer space, and the settlement of disputes.”27
Among the five treaties, the Outer Space Treaty is perhaps the most comprehensive and
relevant to what is known as “space law.”28 Some even refer to this Treaty as “the Magna Carta
of Space.”29 Critically, the Treaty outlines principles for the exploration of and operation within
space. First, according to the Treaty, all countries are free to explore outer space, and space
activities should benefit all.30 Second, “there is no claim for sovereignty in space; no nation can
‘own’ space, the Moon or any other body.”31 Third, the Treaty bans the use of weapons of mass
destruction, and furthermore, it requires that any use of the Moon, the planets, and other celestial
bodies be for peaceful purposes.32 Fourth, all astronauts are deemed “envoy[s] of mankind,” and

25

Dec. 18, 1972, 1362 U.N.T.S. 3, 18 I.L.M. 1434 [hereinafter Moon Agreement].
Space Law Treaties and Principles, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2021) [hereinafter UN Treaties
and Principles].
27 Id.
28 See generally, Gabrynowicz, supra note 18 (“Space law is a complex mixture of international and domestic laws
that govern a wide spectrum of activities . . . The fields of law these activities can involve include administrative
law, intellectual property law, arms control law, insurance law, environmental law, criminal law, and comm ercial
law. . . .”); Agostino Latino, Navigating Space Law: Regulations and Legal Principles of the Cosmos, I TAL. I NST.
I NT’L POL. STUD. (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/navigating-space-law-regulations-andlegal-principles-cosmos-28605 (“space law can be defined as the set of rules and principles aimed at regulating the
space beyond the aerial zone and the objects, celestial bodies and related activities within it.”); UN Instruments,
supra note 18 (“[t]he year 1967 represented a milestone in space history with the entry into force of the foundational
instrument of international space law: the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.”).
29 Paul, supra note 14; He Qizhi, The Outer Space Treaty in Perspective, 25 J. Space L. 93 (1997).
30 SPACE FOUNDATION, supra note 22.
31 Id. (emphasis added).
32 Id.
26
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as such, all signatory states must provide support when needed, including assistance with
emergency landing33 Fifth, “signatory states are each responsible for their space activities,
including private commercial endeavors, and must provide authorization and continuing
supervision.”34 Finally, the Treaty warns about contaminating outer space, and directs that
“nations are responsible for damage caused by their space objects.”35
The Moon Agreement both builds on aspects of the Outer Space Treaty and adds other
significant provisions for signatories. Specifically, the Agreement reiterates that the Moon and
other celestial bodies may only be used for peaceful purposes and must not be contaminated.36
Similar to the Outer Space Treaty’s notions on jurisdiction, Article 11 of the Agreement
explicitly states that States’ explorative activities and missions on the Moon cannot establish a
property right or jurisdiction over the Moon:
Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof or natural
resources in place, shall become property of any State, international
intergovernmental or non- governmental organization, national organization or
non-governmental entity or of any natural person. The placement of personnel,
space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations on or below the
surface of the moon, including structures connected with its surface or subsurface,
shall not create a right of ownership over the surface or the subsurface of the
moon or any areas thereof.37
The Agreement also adds that “the UN should always be made aware of any [manned or
unmanned Moon] station . . . and that if resource mining on the Moon becomes feasible, an
international regime must be established to govern how those resources are obtained and used.”38

33

Id.
Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Moon Agreement, supra note 25.
38 Id.; SPACE FOUNDATION , supra note 22.
34
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2. Declarations and Legal “Principles”
In addition to creating the five treaties on outer space, COPUOS also developed five
governing “principles”, all of which have been formally adopted through United Nations General
Assembly Resolutions.39 Of these five principles, three are particularly relevant for purposes of
this paper. First is the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Uses of Outer Space (“The Declaration of Legal Principles”), which was
established in 1962, and provides legal guidelines for actors pursuing space exploration and
use.40 More specifically, it establishes the authority of international law. 41 For example, the
fourth principle in the Declaration expounds, “[t]he activities of States in the exploration and use
of outer space shall be carried on in accordance with international law, including the Charter of
the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting
international co-operation and understanding.”42 Additionally, the Declaration addresses the need
for States to ensure even non-governmental compliance; that is, States are essentially responsible
for the actions of the private sector in space. 43 Accordingly, “the activities of non-governmental
entities in outer space shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the State
concerned.”44
Second, COPUOUS established the Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power
Sources in Outer Space (“The Nuclear Power Sources Principles”), which similarly requires that
international law is followed with respect to all activities involving the use of nuclear power

39

UN Treaties and Principles, supra note 25.
G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1962 (Dec. 13, 1963) [hereinafter The Declaration of Legal
Principles], https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/principles/legal-principles.html.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
40
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sources.45 These Principles specifically address general goals for radiation protection and nuclear
safety. Accordingly, “[i]n order to minimize the quantity of radioactive material in space and the
risks involved, the use of nuclear power sources in outer space shall be restricted to those space
missions which cannot be operated by non-nuclear energy sources in a reasonable way.”46
Furthermore, these Principles stress the notion of international responsibility. Principle 8 of the
Nuclear Power Sources expressly incorporates article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, requiring
that States “bear international responsibility for national activities involving the use of nuclear
power sources in outer space, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or
by non-governmental entities . . . .”47
Lastly, the Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for
International Direct Television Broadcasting (“The Broadcasting Principles”) was created to both
fill the void left by the Outer Space Treaty on issues relating to satellite broadcasting and to
pacify fears that broadcast signals might threaten internal national affairs.48 According to The
Broadcasting Principles, States should inform the UN of all activities in the field of international
direct television broadcasting by satellite, and should notify and consult any State where the

45

G.A. Res. 47/68, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/68 (Dec. 14, 1992) [hereinafter The Nuclear Power Sources Principles],
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/principles/nps-principles.html.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 G.A. Res. 37/92, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/92 (Dec. 10, 1982) [hereinafter The Broadcasting Principles],
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/principles/dbs-principles.html; A Brief Overview of Norms
Development in Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS I NSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH (May 30, 2013)
[hereinafter Overview: Outer Space Norms] (citing Stefanie Schmahl, The United Nations Facing the Challenges of
the “Information Society”, in M AX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 197-231 (A. von Bogdandy & R.
Wolfrum eds., 2007); V. Kopal, The role of United Nations declarations of principles in the progressive
development of space law, 16 J. SPACE L. 12 (1988)), https://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/a -briefoverview-of-norms-development-in-outer-space-en-462.pdf (“[w]hen the first satellite began to transmit radio
signals back to Earth, space activities were greatly influenced by Cold War tensions. Concerns over propaganda and
state sovereignty left many wondering whether broadcast signals were a threat to internal national affairs. Finding
that the Outer Space Treaty did not directly address direct broadcasting by satellite, a number of initiatives sought to
address the legal and political questions that arose from direct broadcasting by satellite.”).
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satellite broadcasting services is intended to be received. 49 Similar to the previous two Principles,
this Principle commands that international law should apply to all activities relating to
international broadcasting by satellite.50 Likewise, this Principle reiterates the notion of State
responsibility for all those who carry out broadcasting activities under a State’s jurisdiction (i.e.,
both governmental and non-governmental).51 Notably, however, a consensus could not be
reached regarding The Broadcasting Principles, and few states have complied with its
provisions.52 During the drafting period for these Principles, it became clear that it would be
“impossible to reconcile positions on several issues, including obligations for state consultations,
the seeking of prior consent for broadcasting into a foreign state, state responsibility for all
broadcast activities, and the applicability of the principles to international law.” 53 The two major
opposing positions were “those most interested in preserving the free flow of information and
those seeking to protect state sovereignty.”54
3. International Space Station-Related Agreements
Other significant instruments in the space law arena pertain to the International Space
Station. As mentioned above, the International Space Station (“ISS”) was constructed to
maintain human presence in space, and many entities around the world, both governmental and
non-governmental, have contributed to the establishment of the ISS. Considering the various
actors and interests involved, several key instruments were created: (1) the Intergovernmental
Agreement on Space Station Cooperation; (2) four memoranda of understanding between NASA

49

The Broadcasting Principles, supra note 48.
Id.
51 Id.
52 Overview: Outer Space Norms, supra note 48.
53 Id.
54 Id.
50
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and the Canadian Space Agency, the European Space Agency, the Russian Space Agency, and
the government of Japan; and (3) the Code of Conduct for the International Space Station Crew.
The Intergovernmental Agreement on Space Station Cooperation (“IGA”), which is
signed by 15 governments, provides a “a long term international cooperative framework on the
basis of genuine partnership, for the detailed design, development, operation, and utilization of a
permanently inhabited civil Space Station for peaceful purposes, in accordance with international
law.”55 The IGA permits the Partner States to extend their own national jurisdiction to the
elements and over personnel they provide. For example, European law applies to the European
Columbus Laboratory. Essentially, this legal framework recognizes “the jurisdiction of the
Partner States’ courts and allows the application of national laws in such areas as criminal
matters, liability issues, and protection of intellectual property rights.”56
The four memoranda of understanding requires that each Partner State approve the Code
of Conduct before sending crew members to the station. The Code of Conduct “establishes a
chain of command on-orbit, a clear relationship between ground and on-orbit management,
management hierarchy, standards for work and activities in space, and disciplinary
regulations.”57 As explained in the memoranda, the Code of Conduct’s approval is critical since
the crew of the ISS operates as one integrated team.58

55

Agreement among the Government of Canada, Governments of Member States of the European Space Agency,
the Government of Japan, and the Government of the Russian Federation , and the Government of the United States
of America Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, Jan. 29, 1998, at
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/12927-Multilateral-Space-Space-Station-1.29.1998.pdf (last
visited Dec. 2, 2021) [hereinafter ISS Agreement].
56 International Space Station Legal Framework, THE EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY,
https://www.esa.int/Science_Exploration/Human_and_Robotic_Exploration/International_Space_Station/Internation
al_Space_Station_legal_framework (last visited Dec. 2, 2021).
57 Joanne Wheeler & Vicky Jeong, The Space Law Review: International Treaties, SPACE L. R EV. (2020)
[hereinafter Wheeler, Space Law Review], https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-space-law-review/internationaltreaties.
58 Id.
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In sum, the various treaties, principles, and agreements that make up space law generally
encompass the following three ideals: (1) no State has ownership or jurisdiction over outer space
and celestial bodies, and all States are free to carry out space-related activities (i.e., exploration,
satellite broadcasting, etc.); (2) the various space-related activities conducted by States should be
for peaceful purposes; and (3) States bear responsibility for the actions and activities of both
governmental and non-governmental actors under their jurisdiction. 59
B. Is Space Law Enforceable?
The enforceability of space law is widely debated.60 On the one hand, space law has
lasted for over half a century and has rarely, if ever, been violated. 61 Some have attributed space
law’s lasting impact to the flexibility it offers, as well as the context surrounding its inception. 62
On the other hand, space law can hardly be violated if it is not agreed to, signed, or ratified.63
Additionally, many provisions set forth in the various space law treaties and principles are
idealistic in nature.64 Moreover, the ambiguity within the various legal instruments pertaining to

59

See SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION, H ANDBOOK FOR NEW ACTORS IN SPACE 3-10 (Christopher D. Johnson ed.,
2017) [hereinafter SPACE H ANDBOOK],
https://swfound.org/media/205710/handbook_for_new_actors_in_space_2017_web2.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2021).
60 See generally, Goguichvili, supra note 15; Hertzfeld, supra note 16; Krause, supra note 16.
61 See supra note 16 and accompanying text; Jill Stuart, The Outer Space Treaty has been remarkably successful –
but is it fit for the modern age?, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 27, 2017), https://theconversation.com/the-outer-spacetreaty-has-been-remarkably-successful-but-is-it-fit-for-the-modern-age-71381 (“over the 50 years of it’s existence,
the treaty has never actually been violated. Although many practical challenges have been made – these have always
been made with pa rs of the treaty in mind, rather than seeking to undermine it entirely.”).
62 See Loren Grush, How an international treaty signed 50 years ago became the backbone for space law , THE
VERGE (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/27/14398492/outer-space-treaty-50-anniversaryexploration-guidelines (“the hallmark of the Outer Space Treaty is that it isn’t too detailed. ‘It doesn’t solve every
problem’ . . . The document is just 17 short articles in length; as a comparison, the Law of the Sea Treaty — a set of
rules governing the use of the world’s oceans — spans hundreds of articles in length . . . Created when space travel
was in its infancy, the agreement was meant to address issues that could arise as space technology advanced.”).
63 See, e.g., The Moon Agreement, supra note 25; Newman, supra note 11 (“[t]he Moon Agreement of 1979
attempted to prevent commercial exploitation of outer-space resources, but only a small number of states have
ratified it – the US, China and Russia haven’t.”).
64 See Beaver, supra note 18 (the issue with the Outer Space Treaty “is its largely ambiguous and idealist nature,
indicative on the drafters’ intention for future generations to clarify emerging space related issues as the years
passed. Review of various articles within the Outer Space Treaty leave much room for interpretation especially
regarding the idea of commercial entities undertaking space mining operations.” (internal citations omitted)).
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space law have left ample room for interpretation—a fact that many States have capitalized on
when conducting space-related activities.65 The arguments for and against the enforceability of
space law will be discussed in turn.
1. Yes, Space Law IS Enforceable
For those that argue that space laws are enforceable, the concept of customary law 66 is
key. Accordingly, “long before the conclusion of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, important
principles had been established as customary international space law[,]” most of which were later
explicitly adopted by the various space law treaties. 67 Thus, because the Outer Space Treaty
merely codified existing customary laws, the Treaty is considered binding on all members of the
international community—with or without their signature and ratification. 68 This is why some
scholars believe that the existing space law regime, as a “soft law,” works. 69

65

Id.
66

Customary law is not a written source. A rule of customary law, e.g., requiring States to grant
immunity to a visiting Head of State, is said to have two elements. First, there must be widespread
and consistent State practice – ie States must, in general, have a practice of according immunity to
a visiting Head of State. Secondly, there has to be what is called “opinio juris”, usually translated
as “a belief in legal obligation; ie States must accord immunity because they believe they have a
legal duty to do so.
Christopher Greenwood, Sources of International Law: An Introduction (2008),
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/Greenwoodoutline.pdf ; see also Rebecca Crootof, Change Without Consent: How
Customary International Law Modifies Treaties, 41 YALE J. I NT’L L. 237, 284 (2016) (“treaty and customary
international law are considered coequal sources of international legal obligations”).
67 In contrast to other international customary laws (i.e., head -of-state immunity), space law became customary
rather quickly; this was perhaps due to the reality that space explorations and activities were historically infrequent.
However, “most [scholars have] held that international law, particularly the customary law of outer space, does not
require the existence of practice for a long period of time.” See Qizhi, supra note 29 (citing V.S. Vereshchetin and
G.M. Danilenko, Custom as A Source of International Law of Outer Space, 13 J. SPACE L. 22 (1985)). See also
Christopher D. Totten, Head-of-State and Foreign Official Immunity in the United States After Samantar: A
Suggested Approach, 34 FORDHAM I NT’L L. J. 332 (2011) (the “concept of immunity for foreign heads of state has
existed since ancient times”).
68 Qizhi, supra note 29 (citing II Y.B. I NT ’L . L. C OMM ’N. 368-72 (1950) (“A principle or rule of customary
international law may be embodied in a bipartite or multipartite agreement so as to have, within the stated limits,
conventional force for the state parties to the agreement so long as the agreement is in force; yet it would continue to
be binding as a principle or rule of customary international law for other states.”)).
69 See Hertzfeld, supra note 16.
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The multilateralist 70 nature of the various treaties that have been adopted only furthers the
argument that space law is enforceable. 71 To be sure, the UN has explicitly qualified all five
treaties and principles as multilateral legal instruments. 72 As a result, “[i]mplications for not
complying could include sanctions, but mainly a lack of legitimacy and respect which is of
importance in the international arena.”73
The flexibility of existing space law perhaps poses a double-edged sword. To those who
consider space law enforceable, its lack of detail is a good thing: “[b]uilt into the [Outer Space
Treaty] was the promise of a future that wasn’t yet known, so the text was purposefully designed
to be flexible and open to interpretation. Much of that promise has been met . . . .”74
2. No, Space Law IS NOT Enforceable
Space laws are not anomalous as compared to other internationally crafted laws, and as
such, they face many of the same hurdles.75 Most notably, while treaties are binding on the
nations who sign them, there is a striking lack of enforcement. Specifically, in the context of
space law, there are no “space police.” This means that an individual, a company, and even a
signatory of the space law treaties or other instruments can simply ignore the obligations and

70

[M]ultilateralism is an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of
“generalized” principles of conduct—that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions,
without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific
occurrence. John Ruggie, Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution, 46 I NT’L ORG. 562, 571 (1992).
71 Stuart, supra note 60. See also Goguichvili, supra note 15 (“multilateral agreements have facilitated international
cooperation and legal frameworks for participating states in their space activities and projects”).
72 See Status of International Agreements relating to Activities in Outer Space , UN OFFICE OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS
(Jan 1, 2021), https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/misc/lts/Int._Agreements.pdf .
73 Stuart, supra note 60. See also Liability Convention, supra note 23; Vincent Pouliot, Multilateralism as an End in
Itself, 12 International Studies Perspectives 18-26 (2011), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2010.00416.x,
(“multilateralism lends legitimacy to the policies that it generates by virtue of the debate that the process necessarily
entails”).
74 Sarah Kellog, 50 Years of Space Law: Time to Rewrite the Rules?, WASHINGTON LAWYER (December 2017),
https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/7/314/files/2018/10/Sp.-Law-Article-DC-Bar_December20171wimfgn.pdf.
75 Krause, supra note 16 (the Outer Space Treaty is “very similar to maritime law, which guarantees peaceful
passage through navigable waters by ships of all nations. But in application, the treaty is more similar to the
Antarctic Treaty System, a series of international agreements that call for cooperativ e management of Antarctica as
a non-militarized environment, and put off claims of sovereignty for an indefinite period.”).

- 15 -

legalities if they so choose.76 Moreover, while “principles adopted by the General Assembly
reflect and supplement those set out in the UN space treaties[,]” they are not legally binding.77
Further, what happens when an active State actor does not sign the treaty or agreement
that directly addresses its activity in space? The Moon Agreement is exemplary. 78 That
Agreement states that “if resource mining on the Moon becomes feasible, an international regime
must be established to govern how those resources are obtained and used.” 79 The United States,
however, never signed this Agreement. Should the US be free to excavate resources from the
Moon, without the approval of the UN or other States who have signed the Agreement?
Another difficulty with enforceability stems from a key component of space law: State
responsibility. Several of the UN Treaties and Principles require States to obtain compliance
from citizens and private actors venturing into space. 80 Yet, the accountability of States for the
actions of their citizens in outer space has been aptly described as contrasting “the usual affairs
of humankind” since
. . . governments are not generally responsible for the actions of their citizens. If a
citizen of Country A goes abroad to Country B, and someone in Country B wants
to bring a claim against them, they don’t often also name Country A’s
government as a defendant. In the usual dealings between people and foreign
governments, people are not the responsibility of their governments. This is not
the case in outer space activities. In fact, in activities dealing with outer space, the
situation is reversed.81
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Stuart, supra note 60.
Wheeler, Space Law Review, supra note 57. See generally Overview: Outer Space Norms, supra note 48.
78 See discussion supra Section II.A.1.
79 Id.
80 See, e.g., The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 21. See also Frans G. von der Dunk, The Origins of Authorisation:
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty and International Space Law, Space, Cyber, and Telecommunications Law
Program Faculty Publications 69 (2011),
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1068&context=spacelaw (“[c]ontrary to the version of
the concept applicable under general international law, where ‘direct state responsibility’ only pertained to acts
somehow directly attributable to a state and states could only be addressed for acts by private actors under ‘indirect,’
‘due care’/ ‘due diligence’ responsibility, Article VI made no difference as to whether the activities at issue were the
state’s own (‘whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies’ . . .) or those of private actors (. . . ‘or
by non-governmental entities’)”).
81 SPACE H ANDBOOK, supra note 59, at 9.
77
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Thus, while the frequent imposition of State Responsibility found in space treaties, principles,
and agreements is idealistic, it is counterintuitive. Moreover, the lack of specific guidance under
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty leaves a plethora of unanswered questions:
What is the exact scope of the international responsibility which any state carries
under this key clause, as no doubt being that state’s main concern in terms of
implementing the [authorization] requirement and using it for that purpose? To
what extent would such [authorization] then be able to cover also all possible
situations where international liability, under the Liability Convention, may be
claimed? What would be the ramifications of one state [authorizing], through
registration of the space object, the operations undertaken therewith, on a quasinational/ quasi-territorial basis, with another state [authorizing] the operator of
that subject to undertake such operations on the basis of national and/or territorial
jurisdiction?82
Article VI is not the only provision within the realm of space law that has created
uncertainty; recall, the ambiguity of the Outer Space Treaty poses a double-edged sword.83 For
those arguing against the enforceability of space law, the lack of detail in the various space law
instruments is critical.84 For example, the Outer Space Treaty forbids the use of weapons of mass
destruction in space.85 However, such weapons are not the only option that could threaten the
peaceful exploration of all States in space. In fact, almost “any satellite could have a malevolent
purpose due to the nature of “dual use” technologies—devices that can be deployed for both
peaceful and military purposes.”86 To further illustrate, consider the potential catastrophic effects
of anti-satellite weapons (“ASAT”):

82

Von der Dunk, supra note 79.
See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
84 See Hertzfeld, supra note 16 (“There still remain many issues concerning space law that are unresolved. One
reason is the lack of issues ripe for a court or legislative determination. Another reason is the built-in flexibility of
the system of space laws that allow for changing interpretations and definitions”); Becky Ferreira, The new Space
Race, and the desperately outdated laws that govern it, DOCUMENT JOURNAL (May 28, 2019),
https://www.documentjournal.com/2019/05/the-new-space-race-and-the-desperately-outdated-laws-that-govern-it/
(“‘[t]he treaties are good documents but they set up principles . . . They don’t get that specific. There are a lot of
voids that are not clearly delineated in the treaties that will be resolved by national interpretations, which will
vary’”).
85 The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 21.
86 Ferreira, supra note 83.
83
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In the absolute worst-case scenarios, anti-satellite weapons could perform “kinetic
kills” on other spacecraft by intentionally colliding with them. In addition to
satellite-on-satellite violence, missiles could be launched from the ground to
obliterate objects in orbit. Such a hypothetical attack would not only damage its
main target, it could also unleash a torrent of dangerous debris in orbit that could
threaten other spacecraft.
This point, of course, turns back to the lack of “space police” enforcing existing space laws.
In a similar vein, while the Outer Space Treaty and Moon Agreement require that activities
in space be conducted for “peaceful purposes,” they do not prevent States from maintaining
military presence in space.87 More specifically, though States cannot establish military
bases on the Moon or other celestial bodies88 , they are free to create and maintain space
stations similar to the ISS.89

Article I of the Outer Space Treaty also casts uncertainty, where only national
appropriation of outer space and the celestial bodies is prohibited.90 This “leaves open the
possibility of an individual or private association lawfully appropriating any part of outer
space.”91 Similarly, Article II of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits national appropriation of
outer space territory.92 Thus, when read together with Article I, “the prohibition on national
appropriation establishes that outer space is a res communis, not subject to the common
heritage doctrine93 , which means that states are free to use the area so long as their activities

See The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 21; Moon Agreement, supra note 25; Paul, supra note 14 (“[t]he
‘peaceful purposes’ limitation doesn’t apply to deep space activity . . . There, the bar is exclusively on nuclear
weapons and weapons of mass destruction. There’s no prohibition on things like setting up military bases,
conducting weapons testing, or bringing weapons into space, so long as they aren’t weapons of mass destruction and
comply with other Outer Space Treaty requirements”).
88 Moon Agreement, supra note 25.
89 Paul, supra note 14 (In 2019, “President Trump announced the establishm ent of the U.S. military’s Space
Command . . . like the U.S., Russia and China are building space forces, and ‘once you have a dedicated force,
you’re preparing for war’”).
90 See Beaver, supra note 18.
91 Id.
92 The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 21.
93 The common heritage doctrine is
87
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do not deprive other states of the same right.”94 However, without the international
oversight and guarantee of preservation for future generations, States may contrive
conflicting interpretations that focus on their own economic gain.95

Overall, while there is merit to arguments made in support of the enforceability of
existing space law, the arguments against are far more robust. 96 In the very least, it can be
agreed upon that existing space law has been effective up until the 21 st century.

III.

21st Century Space Developments
Although at first glance the existing body of space law appears to address a wide variety

legal and geo-political issues, with the modernization and development of new space-related
technology, these laws may prove ineffective, or in the very least, outdated. This Section will
examine the developments made in both space exploration and commercialization.
A. Space Exploration
Among the most obvious developments in space is the capability, efficiency, and
feasibility of space exploration. NASA, for example, has refocused its direction in space to four

comprised of several elements and generally provides that: (1) the designated areas shall not be
appropriated, (2) the use of the area and its resources will be managed by an interna tional
authority, (3) benefits from the area will be actively and equitably shared, (4) the area will be
peacefully used, and (5) the area's resources will be protected and preserved for the benefit of all
mankind.
David Johnson, Limits on the Giant Leap for Mankind: Legal Ambiguities of Extraterrestrial Resource Extraction ,
26 AM. U. I NT’L REV. 1479, 1484 (2011).
94 Id. But See Lynn M. Fountain, Note, Creating Momentum in Space: Ending the Paralysis Produced by the
"Common Heritage of Mankind" Doctrine, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1753, 1753 n.3 (2003) (arguing that the Common
Heritage doctrine should not apply to outer space because it represents a classic "tragedy of the commons" problem
and fails to efficiently allocate resources).
95 See Beaver, supra note 18.
96 See also Feyisola Ruth Ishola, Oluwabusola Fadipe & Olaoluwa Colin Taiwo, Legal Enforceability of
International Space Laws: An Appraisal of 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 9 NEW SPACE 1 (March 19, 2021),
https://doi.org/10.1089/space.2020.0038 (“efforts to structure space governance by creating soft laws commendable
as they may be, do nothing to dispense of the fact that non -binding decisions and resolutions are not capable of
enforcing the rule of law…this underscores the need to intensify international exchanges and cooperation in the
governance of outer space on the basis of security and stability and peaceful uses.”)
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strategic goals: (1) transition U.S. human spaceflight in low-Earth orbit to commercial
operations, which support NASA and the needs of an emerging private sector market; (2) extend
long-duration U.S. human spaceflight operations to lunar orbit; (3) enable long-term robotic
exploration of the Moon; and (4) enable human exploration of the Moon as preparation for
human missions to Mars and deeper into the solar system. 97
NASA, and the US government, are not alone in their endeavors to propel space
explorations. On the contrary, “Russia and China have begun to draw up ambitious plans f or
missions that would directly compete with those of the United States and its partners, ushering in
a new era of space competition that could be as intense as the first.” 98 Among these plans, the
two countries are coordinating a series of lunar missions, which will culminate in the
construction of a permanent research base on the South Pole of the moon by 2030.” While China
is not among the Partner States of the ISS 99 , Russia currently is. So, what will happen when the
research base is constructed? Will Russia back out of its obligations and agreements relating to
the mission of the ISS? Some publications have indicated this possibility, emphasizing that
Russian officials have signaled that they may pull out of the ISS once the current agreement
expires in 2024.100 Aside from the Chinese-Russian partnership in space, China has by itself has
developed its space program. In the Spring of 2021, “China launched the first modules of a new
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NASA's Exploration Campaign: Back to the Moon and on to Mars, NASA (April 16, 2018),
https://www.nasa.gov/feature/nasas-exploration-campaign-back-to-the-moon-and-on-to-mars.
98 Andrew E. Kramer & Steven Lee Myers, Russia, Once a Space Superpower, Turns to China for Missions, N.Y.
TIMES (June 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/15/world/asia/china-russia-space.html.
99 Id. (“China . . . was never invited to join the International Space Station. Legislation adopted by the American
Congress in 2011 prohibited NASA from virtually any cooperation with the Chinese space administration or any
related companies, citing the risk of espionage.”). See also Makena Young, Bad Idea: The Wolf Amendment
(Limiting Collaboration with China in Space), DEFENSE 360 (Dec. 4, 2019), https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-thewolf- amendment-limiting-collaboration-with-china-in-space/.
100 Kramer & Myers, supra note 55.
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orbiting space station.” Evidently, with the expansion of space exploration – in part, by
competing actors – comes a need for more comprehensive space governance.
B. The Commercialization of Space Travel
In addition to space exploration, the commercialization of space travel may require a
more complete international legal response. Recently, a handful of American entrepreneurs have
ventured into the field of space travel. Tesla’s CEO, Elon Musk, founded “SpaceX to develop
reusable rockets that would lower the cost of blasting people and things into space.” 101 In 2012,
SpaceX “became the first private company to send a spacecraft to the International Space
Station.”102 In September 2021, SpaceX launched four private passengers into orbit Wednesday
on the first mission to space with an all-civilian crew.”103 However, Elon Musk’s ultimate plan is
to facilitate humanity’s ability to settle on Mars. 104 Accordingly, Musk wants to establish a city
of one million people on Mars by 2050, using a fleet of 1,00 SpaceX Starships to shuttle the
population to the red planet.105
Likewise, Amazon’s former CEO and billionaire Jeff Bezos founded Blue Origin with
the goal to make space exploration cheaper through recyclable boosters. 106 Since its founding,
Blue Origin has focused on space tourism. In fact, in July 2021, Blue Origin completed its first
human flight, with Bezos aboard.107 Two years earlier, in 2019, “Bezos revealed plans for a lunar
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Tim Levin, Jeff Bezos just launched to the edge of space. Here's how Blue Origin's plans stack up to SpaceX and
Virgin Galactic., BUSINESS I NSIDER (July 20, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-jeff-bezosbranson-spacex-blue-origin-virgin-2021-5.
102 Id.
103 Denise Chow, SpaceX makes history with first all-civilian spaceflight, NBC NEWS (Sept.15, 2021),
https://www.nbcnews.com/science/space/spacex-makes-history-first-civilian-spaceflight-rcna2027.
104 Levin, supra note 58.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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lander called Blue Moon, which the company said would be ready in 2024 and would eventually
help establish a "sustained human presence" on the moon.”108
On the other hand, Richard Branson entered the billionaire space race with subtly
different goals.109 Branson’s Virgin Galactic instead “is focused on suborbital tourism, rather
than launching people and payloads into space. It also has a radically different method of sending
spacecraft out of Earth's atmosphere[,]” with spacecraft being flown to 50,000 f eet.110 From that
point, “the ship detaches and glides for a few seconds before firing up its rocket motor and
beginning a near-vertical ascent to about 300,000 feet.”111 Since sending its first fully-crewed
flight to the edge of space, Virgin Galactic has sold 600 passenger tickets for between $200,000
and $250,000 each.112 Virgin Galactic’s future plans, similar to SpaceX and Blue Origin, seeks to
make human presence in space more economical and efficient. Specifically, “Virgin
Galactic plans to operate a fleet of vehicles that could fly tourists to space hotels, transport
researchers to floating labs, or provide lightning-fast transcontinental flights.”113
Finally, several companies have indicated an interest in creating tourist accommodations
in space. For example, the Orbital Assembly Corporation, is planning to open a luxury space
hotel, the “Voyager Station”, by 2027.114 This hotel would accommodate 280 guests, plus 112
crew members.115 Still, while the commercialization of space opens a plethora of opportunities
for mankind, it concomitantly opens a wide variety of legal issues, especially pertaining to
jurisdiction.
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Id.
Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Nick Mafi, The World’s First Space Hotel to Open in 2027, ARCHITECTURAL DIGEST (March 5, 2021),
https://www.architecturaldigest.com/story/worlds-first-space-hotel-open-2027.
115 Id.
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IV.

Shaping Biden’s Foreign Policy on Space
As U.S. Representative Jim Bridenstine has illuminated, “[f]ifty years ago there were two

nations in space ... and our main concern was nuclear proliferation.”116 Now, however, “almost
every nation on Earth has some sort of presence in space.”117 Yet, as mentioned above, space
exploration and activity are not limited to government actors; to the contrary, non-governmental
actors—particularly, billionaires within U.S. jurisdiction—have moved to the forefront outer
space developments.118 Therefore, comprehensive space law reform is not only necessary for all
members of the international community, it is also pivotal for Biden Administration in order to
bridle the billionaire space race.
A. Outer Space Multilateralism Revamped
Multilateralist cooperation, when executed correctly, can be a powerful and effective tool
for tackling some of the world’s most difficult problems – “from climate change and poverty
eradication to abuses of human rights and arms proliferation” and even further to the prevention
of world pandemics such as COVID-19.119 Recently, Secretary Blinken emphasized the Biden
Administration’s renewed multilateralist interest and efforts:
[w]e have rejoined the Paris climate accord, recommitted to the World Health
Organization, and we’re seeking to rejoin the Human Rights Council. We’re
engaged in diplomacy to return to mutual compliance with the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action and to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation
regime. We are by far the largest contributor to COVAX, the best vehicle for the
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Krause, supra note 16.
Id.
118 See discussion supra Section III.A-B.
119 Stronger Multilateralism Key to Tackling Tough Global Challenges but Not at Expense of State Sovereignty,
Several Speakers Warn as General Assembly Debate Continues, UN (Sept. 28, 2019),
https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12198.doc.htm; see also Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, Virtual Remarks
at the UN Security Council Open Debate on Multilateralism (May 7, 2021) [hereinafter Blinken, Virtual Remarks],
https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-virtual-remarks-at-the-un-security-council-open-debate-onmultilateralism/ (“[w]e built the multilateral system in part to solve big, complex problems like these, where the
fates of people around the world are tied together and where no single country – no matter how powerful – can
address the challenges alone”).
117
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equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, and we’re making tens of millions
of doses available to others without political considerations. 120
Blinken also announced the Biden Administration’s willingness to work with nontraditional partners for the greater good.121 Such partnerships can be forged “across regional
lines, bringing together cities, the private sector, foundations, civil society, and social and youth
movements.”122 Moreover, while Blinken acknowledged that U.S. interests continue to diverge
from those of the United Nations, he nevertheless promised that the Biden Administration “will
spare no effort to find and stand on that common ground with any country that upholds its
[multilateralist] commitments.”123 Given the Biden Administration’s enthusiasm to revitalize
international cooperation, spearheading the construction of a new or updated, comprehensive
treaty on outer space would likely only further legitimize the United States as a global partner. 124
Although a binding update or successor to existing space law may seem daunting given the
current geopolitical landscape, “the fact that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. overcame deep mutual
animosities to create the [Outer Space Treaty] in 1967 remains an inspiring example of the
foresight we require in [2021].”125
So, what should a revamped treaty on outer space look like? There are at least three key
concerns that must be addressed: (1) jurisdiction and appropriation in space; (2) responsibility
and liability of non-governmental actors; and, (3) non-nuclear warfare in space. In other words, a
treaty reflecting modern advancements in space will comprehensively tackle issues on space
governance, the exploration and commercialization of space, and international security in space.
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Blinken, Virtual Remarks, supra note 118.
Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See generally Pouliot, supra note 73 (arguing that “multilateralism as its own end constitutes a pragmatic, first
step toward enhancing global governance”).
125 Ferreira, supra note 83.
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As a preliminary matter, it is impractical from a historical perspective to maintain an antisovereignty and anti-appropriation approach in space. Concededly, allowing for the
establishment of sovereignty and appropriation would likely create a contentious debate among
members of the international community since space-faring countries like the U.S., Russia, and
China have the upper hand. However, this is a window through which the Biden Administration
can exemplify its commitment to multilateralist efforts in space. Consider, for example, the
possibility that countries could be grouped together – whether by economic necessity, by
regional location, or by common interest – to form recognized coalitions. These coalitions might
each have a “team captain,” determined by the most advanced space program within the
Coalition. At the same time, these coalitions would not be required to invest the same or even
similar resources; instead, each State within the coalition would provide their space program as
is, or as planned. Each coalition would more or less be considered equal in terms of resources,
wealth, and competing interests. Based on this sort of structure, a revamped treaty could likely
permit sovereignty and appropriation based on a first (coalition) come basis. Alternatively, this
structure could remain in place, but before claiming territory or objects in space, approval could
be required first from COPUOUS. More generally, with a new or updated treaty, COPUOUS
should play a larger adjudicative role.
Building on the above illustration, non-governmental actors should no longer be the
responsibility of States.126 As evidenced by the Billionaire Space Race, the space-related
resources and technologies maintained by private actors far exceed that of most States. As such,

Edward Kwakwa, The Future of Multilateralism, ASIL Proceedings (2018) (“multilateralism could also be
perceived in the form of international cooperation that involves states as well as non -state or private sector entities.
It may be useful to think of multilatera lism not just in terms of states, but also in terms of systems that enhance the
global compact—systems that enhance multilateral cooperation. In so doing, it becomes evident that multilateral
enterprises are best conceived of as partnerships, among states and non-state entities alike.”).
126
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an effective multilateral treaty must specifically regulate the private industry in order to instill
conditions of both inclusivity and legitimacy.127 Private actors and organizations can be assigned
to the various coalitions on a continued basis. In the alternative, a treaty could impose on nongovernmental actors a duty to share technology (and profits) with other States, which may or
may not have a space program in place. Similarly, COPUOUS could create an international
taxing system.128 Finally, an updated or new multilateral treaty must explicitly address various
types of space warfare—from satellite interference, to the presence of military forces, and it must
do so in clear terms.129
In sum, while the Biden Administration should strive to spearhead a new or revamped
multilateral treaty on space law, such a treaty could take years to reach. To compound this
reality, “decision-making in COPUOS requires consensus among all Member States . . . [and as]
of 2019, there were 95 members of COPUOS . . . .” 130 Thus, the Biden Administration should
prioritize its efforts on the development and implementation of responsible national space laws—
ones that operate congruently within the existing international legal framework. 131

Id. (“multilateralism can be seen as the greatest source of legitimacy and inclusiveness in the international
system.”).
128 In a very influential book published in 1938 Henry Simons, a professor at the University of
Chicago, made a strong case for taxing all sources of income of individuals as a whole (the global
income) and for taxing this total with progressive rates. This approach, it was argued, would better
satisfy equity considerations. Coming during the Great Depression and soon after the New Deal
(and just before World War II) this tax became very popular in the United States where the “global
income tax” helped finance the Second World War. The concept was exported to other countries,
and in the 1950s and 1960s, American tax consultants were active in trying hard to promote this
tax in developing countries.
Vito Tanzi, Globalization, Tax System, and the Architecture of the Global Economic System, I NTERAMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Globalization -Tax-System-and-theArchitecture-of-the-Global-Economic-System.pdf.
129 C.f. discussion supra Section II.B.2.
130 Wheeler, Space Law Review, supra note 57.
131 See generally Krause, supra note 16; Goguichvili, supra note 15; SPACE H ANDBOOK, supra note 59; Paul, supra
note 14. See also Young, supra note 99 (“[a]s China grows as a space power, U.S. cooperation in selected civil space
projects could be one of the best ways to understand the goals and capabilities of the Chinese space agency.
Moreover, it would establish avenues of communication and trust between the two nations that could be mutually
beneficial in the future. The Wolf Amendment’s statutory exclusion of U.S. – Chinese bilateral cooperation in space
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V.

Conclusion
Any man who had ever worked in a hardened missile site would have felt at home
in Clavius. Here on the Moon were the same arts and hardware of underground
living, and of protection against a hostile environment; but here they had been
turned to the purposes of peace. After ten thousand years, Man had at last found
something as exciting as war . . . Unfortunately, not all nations had yet realized
that fact.132

In short, existing space law is, in the very least, outmoded. With the development and
modernization of space-related technology and capability in the 21 st century comes the need for a
new or revamped multilateral treaty. By spearheading such an initiative, Biden Administration
will establish the United States’ credibility on the international level and will furthermore make
good on its promises to revitalize multilateralist cooperation.

has only incentivized China to accelerate its space development programs, creating a serious challenger to U.S.
leadership in this vital domain of exploration. History has shown that when the U.S. cooperates with foreign
competitors in civil space projects, it enhances NASA’s leadership role. The Wolf Amendment has neither
discouraged Chinese space ambitions or altered China’s behavior on human rights—it has only muddled our
relationship with China and created an opening for a challenger to NASA’s leadership role in space exploration.”)
132 Clarke, supra note 1, at 58.
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